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AN AFRICAN DIMENSION TO THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
MECHANISM: FINDING A PATH TO SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ENERGY SECTOR
PatriciaNelson
I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of "sustainable development" is probably suffenng from its
success as a buzzword. So frequently adopted by so many groups with wildly
varying agendas-from the Sierra Club to the coal mdustry'--the term might seem
to be well on its way to becoming meaningless. 2 Nevertheless, the debatable
political process of imbuing the term with something for everyone has resulted in
one of the essential "takes" on sustainable development: The Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which
makes a comprehensive effort to link sustainable development with the task of
global greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction.3 The link is made by the Protocol's
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which encourages the developed world to
invest m GHG-reduction projects in developing countries. 4 This particular effort
comes with a major problem-one that implicitly suggests its own solution. The
African nations, whose development crises might offer the best crucible to refine
Patricia Nelson graduated from the University of Denver College of Law LL.M. program in natural
resources law in May of 2003. She also holds an LL.M. degree in environmental law from Golden Gate
University and currently works for Environmental Advocates in San Francisco, California.
1. See RON KNAPP, COAL UNDER SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 1, at http://www.wci-coal.com/uploads/IMA2001.doc (2001) (on file with author). Ron
Knapp, in his role as Chief Executive of the World Coal Institute, London, presented this paper at the
2001 Indonesian Mining Conference and Exhibition in Jakarta. For the Sierra Club's conflicting
viewpoint, which seeks to de-emphasize fossil fuels, see SIERRA CLUB, GLOBAL WARMING & ENERGY,
RISKY BUSINESS: TRADING AWAY OUR RESPONSIBILITIES, at http://www.sierraclub.org/
globalwarming/articles/jifact.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2004) (on file with author).
2. Helio International, Energy and Ecodevelopment: An Assessment of the Impact of Energy
Policies on Planet Earth, in GLOBAL REPORT FOR Rio + 10 (Sustainable Energy Watch 2002), at
http://www.helio-internatonal.org/Helio/Repos/2002/English/global-report.html (last visited Mar. 28.
2004) (on file with author). Helio International is an organization that monitors the performance of the
energy industry vis-a-vis the international environmental Conventions. This report incorporates a series
of analyses of various facets of the environmental situation ten years after the 1992 Rio Summit.
3. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention
on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-38, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849, availableat
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004); Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), available at
http://www.jus.uio.noilm/un.climate.change.kyoto.protocol. 1997/doc.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
4. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 12.
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the concept of sustainable development in practice, are poorly served by the
Protocol and its CDM.5
This poor fit does not derive from a lack of relevance or urgency--or even a
lack of agreement as to the basic problem. Although there is a small, vociferous
group of dissenters, the Kyoto Protocol reflects a broad scientific consensus that
nsmg concentrations of industrial gases in the atmosphere will intensify a natural
greenhouse effect. 6 This effect, whose most significant cause is carbon dioxide
(C0 2) emissions from fossil-fuel combustion, 7 is projected to lead, in turn, to rising
sea levels, changes in crop patterns, more frequent droughts, and increasingly
Scientists anticipate that a
extreme swings in weather conditions.8
disproportionate share of these side effects of industrialization will be felt m the
less developed areas that benefit least from industrialization and are least equipped
to deal with its impacts. 9
This scenario of impending disproportionate climate impacts is profoundly
bad news for Africa, which already suffers disproportionately from drought,
flooding, and famme.' ° Even now, widespread displacement of Africans due to
natural and manmade disasters is a common occurrence; the global warming effect

CENTRE ON
5. See UNEP COLLABORATING
DEVELOPMENT
THE
CLEAN
ON
PERSPECTIVES

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT, AFRICAN
at
http://uneprisoe.org/
MECHANISM,

CDMIAccra/AccraPapers.pdf (Aug. 1999) (on file with author). This document is a series of papers
presented at a regional workshop, New Partnerships for Regional Development: The Clean
Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, in Accra, Ghana (Sep. 21-24, 1998) and collected
by UNEP's Riso National Laboratory, Roskilde.
6. The consensus exists not as to the short-term, micro effects, but as to the underlying physical
processes that create the greenhouse effect and the long-term changes that will occur at global level.
See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP I, SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS 7-10, at http://www.gcrio.org/OnLnDoc/pdf/wglspm.pdf (approved Jan. 2001) (on file
with author). See also Richard Wolfson & Stephen H. Schneider, UnderstandingClimate Science, in
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY 3, 41 et seq. (Stephen H. Schneider etal. eds., Island Press
2002); Stephen H. Schneider & Knstin Kuntz-Dunseti, Uncertainty and Climate Change Policy, in
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY 53, 53-87. There is a dissenting view that the effects, and even
the existence, of a greenhouse effect have not been scientifically established. The fossil-fuel industry is
a major proponent of this viewpoint. See, e.g., Dr. Robert C. Balling, Jr., Dr. Craig D. ldso & Dr.
Robert E. Davis, A Critical Review of EPA' "State and Local Climate Change Outreach Kit, at
http://www.greeningearthsociety.org/Articles/2000/browner2.htm (July 2000) (report prepared for The
Greening Earth Society, a climate-change skeptics group) (on file with author). See also THE HEAT IS
ONLINE, THE DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS OF BIG COAL, at http://www.heatisonline.org/
contentserver/objecthandlers/index.cfi?id=4380&method--full (n.d., last visited Mar. 26, 2004)
(discussing the industry stance from an environmentalist perspective) (on file with author) and
Alexander Ewen, Consensus Denied: Holy War over Global Warming, GLOBAL WARMING AND
CLIMATE CHANGE

3 (2000),

at http://www.tenearth.com/climate_3.html4holywar

(on

file with

author).
7. Cheng Zheng-Kang, Equity, Special Considerations,and the Third World, I COLO. J. INT'L
ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 57, 59 (1990).
8. Schneider & Kuntz-Duriseti, supranote 6, at 53-87.
9. Wolfson & Schneider, supra note 6, at 35-41.
10. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, ECONOMIC REPORT ON
AFRICA 2003: ACCELERATING THE PACE OF DEVELOPMENT 25, http://www.uneca.org/era2003/ (2003)

(on file with author).
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will add massive waves of "climate change refugees."" Africa's capacity to adapt
to climate change is also disproportionately low because Africa has limited
technological and economic resources,i2 African scientists have taken the initiative3
to pinpoint the probable impacts of climate change in their various sub-regions.'
Given the existence of many more pressing African problems,' 4 the African
countries' significant commitment of their limited scientific resources to climate
change studies, their speedy ratification of the Framework Convention on Climate
Change. and their efforts to craft regional climate-change and CDM policies
indicate their recognition of the seriousness of the problem and the opportunity
presented by the CDM.15
The Kyoto Protocol's agenda is difficult to apply to Africa m part because
Africa's development problem is so large and various, 16 and in part because the
Protocol spotlights difficult North-South development issues: the deployment of
finite energy resources, environmental degradation, and uneven distribution of
wealth.' 7 A seemingly comprehensive way out of these problems is sustainable
energy development.' 8 However, some Africans are skeptical of a CDM strategy
dominated by the energy sector because, m their experience, the agenda of energy
companies is "rarely compatible" with the urgent needs of other economic
sectors. 19
The lopsided state of global development also makes African energy
development more difficult. The developed countries account for three-quarters of
20
the fossil fuel combustion that has served as the historical path to prosperity
Comparable industrial development of the rest of the world would place a
tremendous strain on finite and dwindling fossil fuel resources. 21 A more

11. Nsongurua J. Udombana, How Should We Then Live? Globalization and Afrtica's
Development, 20 B.U. INT'L L.J. 293, 302-04 (2002); Clare Breidinch, Daniel Magraw, Anne Rowley
& James W Rubin, Current Developments: The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change,92 AM. J. INT'L L. 315, 316 (1998).
12. Wolfson & Schneider, supranote 6, at 36.
13. Under the auspices of the African Centre of Meteorological Applications for Development, in
Niger, the scientists have conducted several studies and predicted accelerated desertification in North
Africa, more widespread drought in the Saharan and Sahelian areas, more intense and frequent flooding
and drought in North-East Africa, increased dry periods in East and Central Africa, increased flooding
in humid areas of West Africa and regular droughts in dry areas of West Africa, and more intense
recurrences of the recent devastating droughts in Southern Africa. Moussa Cisse, Yuoba Sokona &
Jean-Philippe Thomas, ENDA Energy Programme, INFORMATION NOTE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION IN
AFRICA OF TH4EUNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (UNFCCC) § 1.4,

at http://www.enda.sn/energie/rapports/ccd97ouaga/notegb.htm
(Mar. 1997) [hereinafter NOTE ON
IMPLEMENTATION] (on file with author). ENDA is a Third World development group based in Senegal.
14. See id at § 1.3.
15. Id, Davidson & Sokona, supra note 5, at 11.
16. See, e.g., AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, supra note 5.

17. See, e.g, Paul Baer, Equity, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Global Common Resources, in
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at 393-408.
18. NOTE ON IMPLEMENTATION, supranote 13, at § 1.2.
19. Id. § 11.4.
20. Cheng, supra note 7, at 59.
21. See, e.g., John J. Berger, Renewable Energy Sources as
Response to Global Climate
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fundamental, if less obvious, issue is the developed countries' consumption of
more than their share of the atmosphere's limited capacity to absorb the waste
gases of industrialization.22 The developed countries' disproportionate use of the
atmosphere's capacity to assimilate greenhouse gases might have foreclosed the
opportunity for the rest of the world to use the traditional fossil-fuel path
of
23
economic development--at least if environmental goals are taken seriously.
When the climate-change problem is conceived-as an imperative to force a
more equitable sharing of limited atmospheric and energy resources, instruments
such as the Kyoto Protocol present an implicit challenge to developed-world
lifestyles. Thus, it is not surprising that several key features of the Kyoto Protocol
are controversial in the developed world. Perhaps the most controversial feature is
the declining cap on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which will become binding
on parties when and if a sufficient number of countries ratify the Protocol.2 a The
Protocol requires the developed countries to collectively reduce their emissions of
greenhouse gases to a level 5-6% below 1990 levels in the first compliance period
while developing countries have no comparable emission-reduction obligations.25
This "asymmetrical" division of responsibilities embodies a philosophy of "joint
but differentiated responsibility" in which a country's historical contribution to the
climate change problem and its capacity to contribute to the solution determine its
obligations.26
To make the emissions cap more palatable to the developed countries, the
Protocol provides various "flexible mechanisms" to facilitate cost-effective
compliance.27 The flexible mechanisms include a system of emissions trading and
joint implementation projects. 28 The flexible mechanisms seek to direct
investment, on a global basis, to the least-cost options for GHG reduction. 29 This
combination of flexible mechanisms and the emissions cap is commonly viewed as
the Protocol's "carrot and stick."30
Concerns, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at 413-414.
22. Anil Agarwal, A Southern Perspective on Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A
SURVEY, supra note 6, at 377-78 [hereinafter A Southern Perspective].
23. See, e.g., id.
24. Article 2 of the Protocol provides that the UNFCCC Annex I (developed country) parties
"shall" implement policies to reduce their GHG emissions. The emissions cap is set forth in Article 3
and Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. For discussion of the projected effects of uncontrolled GHG
emissions from various perspectives, see CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY- A SURVEY, supra note 6.
25. The initial compliance period is 2008-2012. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 3(i).
26. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 12. See Jacob Werksman, The Clean Development
Mechanism: Unwrapping the "Kyoto Surprise, 7 REV. OF EUR. COM. & INT'L ENVT'L L. 147, 147

(1998).
27. Nathalie Eddy and Glenn Wiser, Public Participationin the Clean Development Mechanism
of the Kyoto Protocol, in THE NEW "PUBLIC"- THE GLOBALIZATION OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 203,
203, (Carl Bruch ed., Environmental Law Institute 2002),
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/
CDMPubPartic.pdf (2002) [hereinafter Eddy & Wiser] (on file with author).
28. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 6 authorizes joint implementation among developed
countries and former Soviet bloc "countries in transition. Article 17 authorizes emissions trading
among developed countries and countries in transition.
29. Schneider etal., CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at xv-xvi.
30. See, e.g., Glenn Wiser, Kyoto Protocol Packs Powerful Compliance Punch, 25 BNA
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The Clean Development Mechanism is the flexible mechanism most
significant to two key players, the global energy industry and the developing
countries. The CDM counts on private investment as part of its implementation
strategy, and was designed to foster sustainable development in the developing
countries as well as the overarching treaty goal of climate change mitigation.3
The CDM permits investors from the developed countries to earn credits toward
their emission-reduction obligations 32 by investing in GHG-reduction projects in
developing countries, thereby promoting sustainable industrialization in those
countries.33
In view of the central role of energy development m the
underdeveloped countries, the CDM offers significant international investment
opportunities for energy companies that develop climate-friendly energy
technologies. 34 Moreover, the CDM is the only flexible mechanism that envisions
the participation of developing countries.
This article discusses the opportunities and pitfalls that the Clean
Development Mechaism poses for developing countries in Africa and the
reciprocal African challenges that present an opportunity to improve the CDM.
Part II outlines the CDM and its links to sustainable development. Part III
describes the African context for energy development under the CDM. Part IV
describes some of the defects in the CDM from an African perspective, and
proposed African solutions. Part V sketches the contours of a wider debate
between the developed and developing countries about the impact of the Kyoto
Protocol and the CDM on equitable global development. Part VI discusses the
potentially problematic role of multinational corporations in sustainable energy
development. Part VII is a conclusion that summarizes the most essential features
of African CDM prospects and proposes a small role for the public in developed
countries, particularly the United States. My underlying premise is that the
African countries, which are among the most vulnerable to the effects of climate
change and the most handicapped in obtaining foreign investment, pose an acid
test for the ideals underlying the CDM. Although there are of a number of
principal players, this article will focus on the global coal industry and the African
governments.

INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENT

REPORTER

86

(January

16,

2002),

available

at

http://www.ciel.org/Publications/NER Compliance.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
31. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 12(9) (participation of private actors) and 12(2) (purpose
of CDM).
32. Id. at art. 12(3)(b).
33. Id. at art. 12(2).
34. See, e.g., William L. Thomas, Daniel Basurto & Gray Taylor, Creating Favorable Climate
for CDM Investment in North America, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 172 (2001) [hereinafter Thomas
et al.], describing the investment of major energy companies in sustainable energy technologies; One L.
Loucks, Business Capitalizing on Energy Transition Opportunities, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A

SURVEY, supra note 6, at 495-507.
35. ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT GROUP, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, THE
CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM: A USER'S GUIDE 11, http://www.undp.orgtseed/eap/htmli/

docs/cdmchapter 1.pdf (2003) (on file with author).
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II. THE CDM AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Dubbed the "surprise of Kyoto, the Clean Development Mechanism was
introduced by the Brazilian delegation, with U.S. support, near the close of
negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol. 36 In essence, the CDM allows developed
countries to meet a portion of their own obligations to reduce emissions by
reducing emissions in developing countries. 37 The investor in such projects, either
a government agency or a private corporation, 38 earns certified emission reductions
(CERs), a form of credit that the investor can either sell or use to meet a portion of
its emission-reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. 39 The flow of
investment dollars and CERs will be guided in large part by the market forces of
risk and profit potential. 40
The CDM is a compromise mechanism designed to promote cooperation
among the developed and developing countries. 4' It reflects in part the developed
countries' wish for ways to reduce their compliance costs.42 The CDM provides
two benefits to developed countries. It creates an alternative mode of compliance
for countries that are unable to fully meet their emission-reduction targets by
regulating their domestic industries.43 It also allows the investor to reduce the cost
of compliance; emission reductions can often be achieved at a lower marginal cost
in the developing country 44
The CDM also reflects the developing countries' high-priority goal of no-cost
or low-cost transfers of funds and technology 45 Such transfers are intended to
36. Farhana Yamin, The Kyoto Protocol: Origins,Assessment and Future Changes, 7 REv. OF
EuR. COM. & INT'L ENVT'L L. 113, 122 (1998).
37 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 12; Eddy & Wiser, supra note 27, at 203.
38. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 12(9).
39. Sean S. Clark, Mark C. Trexler & Laura H. Kosloff, Installment Six of the Climate Treaty
Debate: A Report on COP-6, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 180, 181 (2001) [hereinafter Clark et al.
Emission-reduction requirements are imposed directly on state parties through the Kyoto emissions cap
and indirectly on private corporations in developed countries through regulations imposed by the state
party attempting to comply with the Kyoto cap.
40. YOUIBA SOKONA, STEPHEN HUMPHREYS, JEAN-PHiLiPPE THOMAS, THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT

MECHANISM: WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA? § 2, at http://www.enda.sn/energie/cdm2.htm#4.2 (n.d.,
last visited Mar. 26,2004) [hereinafter WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA?] (on file with author).
41. Id. WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA? summarizes, in rank order, the competing priorities of the
developed and developing countries in the negotiations leading up to the Protocol. These are, for the
developed countries, emissions reduction, an emissions credit and trading program, developing country
participation in emission-reduction requirements, some form of joint implementation, inclusion of
carbon sinks in the calculation of emission reductions, and compliance and verification. Developing
country priorities were sustainable development, equity, common but differentiated responsibilities,
technology transfer, financial assistance, and consideration of special circumstances. For both sides, the
CDM was an afterthought and something of a question mark. Id. at § 2.1.
42. Gray E. Taylor, Global Climate Change Agreements-Do the Storm Clouds Have a Silver
Lining?, 45 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 2.03[2] (1999).
43. Glenn Wiser & Donald Goldberg, The Compliance Fund: A New Tool for Achieving
Compliance Under the Kyoto Protocol 3-4, http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ComplianceFund.pdf
(June 1999). This is a publication of the Center for International Environmental Law.
44. Eddy & Wiser, supra note 27, at 203.
45. WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA?, supranote 40, at 2.
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mitigate the impacts of an impending acceleration of industrialization in the
developing countries by enabling developing countries to build up a "national
capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 46 This aspect of the CDM echoes
what the developing countries have been saying for years: They have as yet
received few of the benefits of industrialization and have contributed relatively
little to the industrial emissions problem, yet the developed countries (which
caused most of the problem) expect them to bear a full share of the burdens of
solving the problem and to make contributions that far exceed their financial and
technical capacities.47 The developing countries suggest that those who have
caused three-quarters of the problem and have superior capabilities to take
corrective action should assume the lion's share of the financial responsibility 48
The developing Southern countries note that the Northern developed countries
achieved their industrialization by exploiting fossil fuels and externalizing the
attendant environmental costs. 49 There is an added cost to taking a different, more
environmentally sound path to development in the South---one that the developed
countries should subsidize, in the view of the developing countries. 50 The CDM,
which holds the prospect of wealth and technology transfer, is one vehicle for
implementing this agenda of wealth transfer. 5' The Southern countries' premise is
that such payments should not be viewed as a gift but as a form of compensation
for using a disproportionate share of the atmosphere's assimilative capacity 52
Developing countries support their agenda with a cost-efficiency and mutualbenefit argument. They emphasize that mefficient industrial processes emit more
carbon dioxide per unit (of energy and other products) manufactured in the
developing world 53 and propose technology transfer as a cost-effective and fair
solution, arguing that low-cost or no-cost access to advanced energy technologies
would enable them to produce more energy and less CO2 with the same natural
resources.54 Developmg countries would then be able to industrialize and
"improve their standard of living without contributing as much as they might
otherwise to the problem of global warming. '55 Part of the moral rationale for
such transfers rests on the distinction between the developing countries' survival
emissions and the developed countries luxury emissions: "Unlike their more46. Clark etal., supra note 39, at 180.
47. Cheng, supra note 7, at 57, 59.
48. Id.at 62.
49. Mark A. Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in InternationalEnvironmental Law, 76
TUL. L. REV.843, 849 (2002).
50. A Southern Perspective,supra note 22, at 377-78.
51. Drumbl, supra note 49, at 854-57. Drumbl notes the developing countries' emerging
negotiation tactic of requiring wealth and technology transfer in exchange for their participation in
global environmental treaties and conditioning the performance of the developing countries upon the
developed countries' compliance with their obligations to transfer wealth and technology. This
approach appears in the Montreal Protocol, the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, and
the Convention on Biological Diversity.
52. A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 377-78.
53. Cheng, supra note 7, at 66-67.
54. Id. at 67
55. Id.at 64.

DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 32:4

developed counterparts, developing nations lose energy to mefficiency and poor
management rather than to overconsumption. Corrective actions can be taken
without large investments of capital. 56 This anticipated globally beneficial effect
will not occur in the absence of some change in the developed world's policy,
because developing countries cannot afford the current high transfer fees for
technology."
The CDM seeks to preserve some degree of national sovereignty in setting
environmental and development prioities. 8 Its evolving design is meant to be
flexible enough to accommodate different national and international agendas. 9
The CDM appears promising to many African (and other) developing countries
because it is incorporates their number-one priority m the climate change debate:
sustainable development. 6° Because the potential flow of funding would be larger
than is currently available from the Global Environmental Facility the CDM is
potentially well suited to meet one of Africa's primary needs, the creation of
regional infrastructure to deliver environmentally sound energy, transportation, and
technical and organizational expertise. 6'
By defining the "purpose" of CDM as assisting the developing countries to
achieve sustainable development, and by requiring an independent certification of
the project, the concept of sustainable development theoretically sets the limit on
the investments that are eligible to earn CERs under the CDM. 62 However, there is
less here than meets the eye because there is no firm, binding definition of
"sustainable development." 63
The most frequently cited definition of "sustainable development" is the one
developed by the Brundtland Commission: "development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs." 64 A World Bank definition emphasizes the ways in which
development is embedded in a country's particular web of social factors-the
"comprehensive nature of development."6 5 This definition, highly influential in

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 67.
Id.
See WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA?, supranote 40, at § 2.
See id.
Id. See also R.S. Maya & John Turkson, CDM Baseline and Additionality in the African

Context-The

Issues, in

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, supra

note 5,at 19 (pointing out the dual objectives of emission reduction and sustainable development).
61. WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA, supranote 40, at § 4.2.
62. Lavanya Rajamim, Renegotiating Kyoto: A Review of the Sixth Conference of Parties to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2000 COLO.J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y YEARBOOK 201,

218(2000).
63. See id. at 218 (applying the concept in the context of the Kyoto Protocol); U.N. WORLD
COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 8 (1987) [Brundtland

Report].
64. See, e.g., the epigraph on the web page for the United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development, at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/.
65. World Bank, The World Bank
Working to Make Development Sustainable, at
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/43ByDocName/SustainableDevelopment
(n.d., last
visited Mar. 28, 2004)(on file with author). The definition appearing on the World Bank web page
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guiding investment, incorporates African priorities such as institutional capacity
and the urgent needs of the rural poor.6 To Africans, however, the inevitable
weave of complex local factors suggests a need for a "made-rn-Africa
prescription" for sustainable African development.67
One African definition that attempts to fulfill this role posits five components
of sustainable development: financial, economic, environmental, technological and
social sustatnability. 68 Many Africans would add another crucial, particularly
African component: institutional sustainability. 69 A high premium is placed on
building institutions to Implement African development priorities. 70 Institutional
capacity is the bottom line for implementing the CDM in Africa because "without
tt[, no policy or strategy can be developed or implemented.",7 1 Africans hope to
build institutions strong and flexible enough to create balanced growth. According
to one succinct and elegant definition: "Broadly, sustainable development can be
defined as attainment of economic growth and equity given environmental
constraints." 72
The mention of "equity" is significant and mirrors the
preoccupations of many developing countries.7
On a global level, the concept of sustainable development is almost infinitely
complex in practice, requiring a skill in balancing many national circumstances
and many kinds of equities in additional to the intergenerational one. One
possibility pertinent to Africa lies in the roots of the concept: the idea of
"ecodevelopment" introduced at the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Environment at
Stockholm. 74 Ecodevelopment is a "mode of development in harmony with nature
and human needs in a given environment"--which "can be different in

discussing the role of the Bank's Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network
states that sustainable development programs entail a parnership among the public and pnvate sectors,
and civil society. Participation, empowerment, strengthened institutions, environmental protection and
conservation, and focus on the rural poor are all foundations for sustained and inclusive economic
growth. The stated objective is to ensure that "actions taken today to promote development and reduce
poverty do not result in environmental degradation or social exclusion tomorrow.
66. Id.
67 Udombana, supranote 11, at 295.
68. Id.
69. Randall Spalding-Fecher, Khorommbi Matibe & Gillian Simmonds, The Clean Development
Mechanism: Energy Projectsfor Africa, m AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
MECHANISM, supra note 5, at 63, 69 [hereinafter Spalding-Fecher et al.]. See also Richard Wolfson &
Stephen H. Schneider, UnderstandingClimate Science, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SuRvEY, supra
note 6, at 3, 36 (regarding Africa's limited capacity to adapt to climate change).
70. See, e.g., Spalding-Fecher et al., supranote 69, at 67-69.
71. Anil Agarwal, Boiling Point: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change/Kyoto Protocol, in GREEN POLITICS 15, 55 (Anil Agarwal et al. eds., New Delhi Centre for
Science and Environment 1999) [hereinafter Boiling Point], citing Youba Sokona, of ENDA, an NGO
headquartered in Senegal; Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 67-68.
72. F.D. Yamba, The Clean Development Mechanism as
Tool for Enhancing Sustainable
Development, in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, supra note 5, at
53-54.
73. See, e.g., A Southern Perspective,supra note 22, at 375 et seq.
74. This is the position of Helio International regarding the global situation for developing
countries in general. See Energy andEcodevelopment, supra note 2.
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industrialized and land-based [rural] countries without inviting judgment., 75 This
concept is particularly pertinent to Africa, with its predominantly rural population
whose needs and priorities diverge from the accustomed perspective in the
developed countries because of its dependence on biomass energy for the
foreseeable future.76
There is one recent definitional trend that has a potential to alter the nature
and the balance of power surrounding CDM projects: The international coal
industry has entered the fray and seized some of the ground usually occupied by
environmental groups. According to the industry, "sustainable development" is the
assurance of a stable supply of energy m a time of escalating demand. 77 In this
context, further development of coal, the fossil fuel that happens to have the
highest level of emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants, 78 is a
"resource bridge" to bring economic development within the reach of as many
nations as possible. 79 Given the mix of equities and resources m Africa, this
version of sustainable development might (or might not) be in the interest of the
various developing countries and is disquieting in view of the amount of power
that large multinational companies may wield vis-A-vts small developing countries.
Moreover, despite its definition of sustainable development, the World Bank
approach to reform in the energy sectors of developing countries does not seek to
mmnimze the use of coal; rather, it focuses on promoting an internationally
competitive coal sector within the developing country and balancing the supply
and demand for coal m specific countries.80 The Bank's energy-sector policy
proposes that subsidies be removed from inefficient coal operations.8' However, it
does not propose the removal of subsidies for the development of new technologies
for high-emission fuels, although such subsidies in wealthy, exporting countries
might effectively limit the choices for energy investments worldwide and might
run counter to local development priorities m developing countries. An ample role
for foreign coal technology is implied m the Bank's more specific goals of
identifying and closing the higher-cost mines, eliminating government
subsidies
82
for local industries, and promoting competition in the industry.
III. THE AFRiCAN CONTEXT FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE CDM

North-South development inequities are particularly glaring in Africa. Africa,

75. Id.
76. Spalding-Fecher et al., supranote 69, at 64.
77 Ron Knapp, supranote 1, at 1.
78. STEPHEN BERNOW,

MICHAEL LAZARUS

& SivAN KARTHA, COAL. AMERICA'S PAST,

AMERICA'S FUTURE? 2-4, al http://www.worldwildlife.org/climate/coalcrossroads.pdf
(Tellus
Institute May 2001) [hereinafter COAL. AMERICA'S PAST] (study prepared for World Wildlife Fund).
79. Ron Knapp, supra note i, at i.
80. THE

WORLD

BANK

GROUP,

MINING:

COAL

SECTOR

RESTRUCTURING,

athttp://www.worldbank.orglogmc/mmmg_coal.htm (n.d., last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (on file with
author).
81. Id.
82. Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 70.
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which has abundant reserves of fossil fuels, currently accounts for only 2.5 percent
of the world's economic actiVity 83 and is unmatched in the "diversity and
complexity" of its environmental and economic problems.84 The U.N. Secretary
General's list of obstacles to African development is daunting even without the
prospect of global warming: it includes "external debt problems, declining external
resource flows, declining terms of trade, barriers to market access for their
products, high population growth, inadequate social development, lack of
infrastructure and environmental constraints, including water shortages."8 5 All of
these market-based and social problems are of course
8 6 exacerbated by AIDS and
Afica's high poverty rate and low standard of living.
Given all of these pressing problems and Africa's minimal contribution to the
global warming problem, reducing greenhouse gas emissions is not high on
Africans' development agenda.8 7 Africans' primary development priorities are the
more urgent ones of8 8 food and energy security for the majority of the population
that lives m poverty.
Perhaps energy development is the heart of the issue. Africa's very low levels
of energy consumption are both "cause and consequence" of underdevelopment,
according to African NGOs.8 9 Africans must consume more energy in order to
"climb out" of both their economic and environmental problems. 90 However,
bringing energy to the African people, sustainable or not, will be exceedingly
difficult, given the reality that Africa has the lowest rate of foreign direct
investment (FDI) In the world 9' and a dysfunctional energy sector.
In this energy sector, consumption of electricity for commercial purposes,
already at the lowest per-capita rate in the world, is falling. 92 Household access to
electricity is even lower due to the limited, creaking energy infrastructure and
rampant poverty 93 Energy intensity, the amount of energy that is burned relative

83. YOUBA SOKONA, Energy in Sub Saharan Africa, Rio + 5 REPORT (AFRICA) 1 (1997), at
(publication of Helio
http://helio.mterserver.net/Helio/anglais/reports/africa.hml#charactenstics
International, discussed at note 2, supra) (on file with author). See also CLAUDE MANDIL,
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY AND AFRICA, at
http://www.tea.orgldbtw-wpd/textbase/papers/2003/aficanenergy.pdf (n.d., last visited Mar. 29, 2004)
(on file with author).
84. Moussa Cisse, Yuoba Sokona & Jean-Philippe Thomas, Introduction to NOTE ON
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 13.
85. Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess.
Supp. No. 1,Para. 140, U.N. Doc. A/56/1 (2001), cited in Udombana, supra note 11, at308.

86. Id.
87. NOTE ON IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 13, at

§ 1.3.

88. Id.
§ 1.2.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Udombana, supra note 11, at 308.

See also Reimund Schwartze, Activities Implemented

Jointly, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at 293-304.
92. Energy in Sub Saharan Afrtica, supra note 83, at 4; NOTE ON IMPLEMENTATION, supra note

13, at § 1.2.
93. Energy in Sub SaharanAfrtica, supra note 83, at 5.
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to economic output, is extraordinarily high, three times higher than in Europe. 94
Power outages and interruptions in fuel supplies are frequent. 9' The Sub-Saharan
region's power-generating capacity is one-twentieth that of Europe. 96 The regional
model for a working energy grid is South Africa, which relies heavily on coalburning power plants.97
For people inside this dysfunctional system, efficient fossil-fuel technology is
a major step up. Indeed, improved access to fossil fuels and cleaner fossil-fuel
technology are high on the list of African development goals. 98 However, the
fossil-fuel model is not the whole solution, m part because it would be expensive
and time consuming. To extend a traditional electrical grid to the entire
population, Africans would have to build an enormous transportation and energydistribution mifrastructure virtually from scratch. 99
Furthermore, another model must be found for the 95% of the rural
population that does not have access to electricity and cannot be connected to an
electrical grid cost-effectively 100 This population, which relies primarily on
biomass fuel and devotes an ever-mcreasing amount of labor to fuel gathering,0i
forms the basis of another set of African energy-development priorities. These
include a "greater range of technological choice, financing mechanisms and
technology support for rural and decentralized energy systems" and "improved
forest management, cook stoves, and charcoal conversion methods to ensure
sustainable and environmentally sound use of traditional fuels." i02 The rural
population is the theoretical customer base for small-scale renewable-energy
technologies that are popular with developed-world advocates of climate change
mitigation. 103
Although people living in poor rural villages are more vulnerable to the
impacts of pollution than other populations and therefore might benefit most from
low-emitting energy technologies, all strategies to develop energy for rural
customers have major economic benefits insofar as they bring industry and jobs to

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. 6; Spalding-Fecher et al., supranote 69, at 64.
Spalding-Fecher et al., supranote 69, at 64.
Id.
See td.
Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 64.
See YOUBA SOKONA, STEPHEN HUMPHREYS & JEAN-PHILIPPE THOMAS, SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT:
A
CENTERPIECE
OF
THE
KYOTO
PROTOCOL
§§
1, 2, 3. 1, at
http://www.enda.sn/energie/susdevkp.htm (n.d., last visited Mar. 28, 2004) [hereinafter A CENTERPIECE
OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL] (on file with author). This is report for the ENDA Tiers Monde, Energy
Programme.
100. Id. § 2.2.
101. A. MARKANDYA, ECONOMICS OF GREENHOUSE GASES: THE INDIRECT COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF GREENHOUSE GAS LIMITATIONS 6.1.2 (UNEP COLLABORATING CENTER ON ENERGY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 1998), at http://www.uccee.org/EconomicsGHG/IndirectCosts.pdf (last visited Mar. 29,
2004).
102. This is one factor in a list of African development priorities formulated at Energy and
Development Research Centre of the University of Capetown. Spalding-Fecher et al., supranote 69, at
64.
103. See A CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 99, at § 2.2.
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rural areas.' 4 Any energy system that creates reliable lighting and pumping
capacities improves several conditions associated with poverty, including a lack of
educational opportunities and poor access to water and health and sanitation
services." °5 Promising clean coal technologies, for example, include integrated
combined-cycle generation, 106 carbon sequestration, 10 7 fluidized-bed combustion,
and coal liquefaction and gasification. t08
Cost is the big drawback to the more advanced fossil fuel technologies. The
price tag for a coal gasification plant ranges from $1.2 to $1.6 million per
megawatt of power. 10 9 Even a conventional coal-fired power plant costs $1 million
per megawatt."l 0 Constructing a natural gas plant costs approximately $550,000
per megawatt and entails a continuing, potentially crippling cost of importing a
fuel that is subject to large price swings--especially in a time of escalating demand
due to environmental concerns."' Such large-scale fossil-fuel investments seem
inconsistent with one important African development concern-that energy
investments should be proportionate to a country's GDP and should not place an
undue burden on other sectors.! 12 In light of the large upfront costs, the low profit
potential of most of the African markets, and the relatively weak bargaining
104. ENERGY AND ATMOSPHERE PROGRAM, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, ET
AL., ENERGY AFTER Rio: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES § 4.2.1, at http://www.undp.org/
seed/energy/chapter4.html [hereinafter ENERGY AFTER Rio] (on file with author).
105. Id. In addition, such projects reduce the hours devoted to gathering fuelwood and water,
freeing up labor for other purposes and indirectly promoting the welfare of women. It is primarily
women who devote increasingly long hours to fuel and water gathering, and women are particularly
vulnerable to health problems caused by inefficient biogas stoves. A. MARKANDYA, ECONOMICS OF
GREENHOUSE GASES: THE INDIRECT COSTS AND BENEFITS OF GREENHOUSE GAS LIMITATIONS, supra
note 101, at § 6.1.2., ENERGY AFTER Rio, supra note 104, at § 4.2.3 (both addressing the situation of
developing countries in general).
106. CARE, ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, at http://www.careenergy.com/technology/utility.asp (n.d.,
last visited Mar. 23, 2004) (on file with author).
107. CSI,
CARBON
SEQUESTRATION
INITIATIVE:
TECHNOLOGY
OVERVIEW,
at
http:llsequestration.mitedu/technologyoverview/index.htnl (n.d., last visited Mar. 28, 2004)
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology project) (on file with author).
108. See, e.g., American Coal Foundation, New Technologies for Coal Combustion, COAL.
ANCIENT GIFT SERVING MODERN MAN, at http://www.ket.org/Tnps/coal/AGSMM/agsmmtech.html
(last updated Oct. 1, 2001).
109. Lisa Kosanovic, Clean Coal? New Technologies Reduce Emissions, But Sharp Criticisms
Persist, EITHE ENVIRONMENTAL MAGAZINE (Jan. 23, 2002), at http://www.enn.com/news/ennstories/2002/01/01232002/s_46190.asp (on file with author).
110. Id.
111. Id. Fuel-switching from coal to natural gas is one of the most popular alternatives for
lowering the environmental impacts of power plants and is often the lowest-cost alternative once an
investment has been made in conventional power plant. See David Mallery, Clean Energy and the
Kyoto Protocol: Applying Environmental Controls to GrandfatheredPower Facilities, 10 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVT'L L. & POL'Y 469, 473 (1999) (noting the lack of incentive to invest in cleaner methods of
coal combustion); CARL E. BEHRENS, THE CLEAN COAL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM: CURRENT
PROSPECTS 3, available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/energy/eng-71.pdf
(Apr. 6, 2001)
(Congressional Research Service report).
112. F.D. Yamba, The Clean Development Mechanism as a Tool for Enhancing Sustainable
Development, in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, supra note 5, at
53, 55.
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position of African countries, a more likely investment scenario might include
decidedly low-tech options such as coal-washing and conventional coal-fired
steam technology." 3
incontrast, some of the available, environmentally oriented technologies that
are well suited to rural villages include more efficient cookstoves, biogas-driven
water pumping systems, household- or village-scale photovoltaic systems, as well
as "liquid fuel production from biomass, biomass co-combustion, wind energy
methane production from
technologies, solar-thermal for heat and electricity
solar and liquid residues and wastes, thermal generation from biomass sources, and
small hydroelectric plants."' " 4 Solar and other renewable energy systems are
suited to the needs of off-grid villages." 5 They are m scale with the needs of
individual villages and would support the African development priorities of
"technological choice" and unproved access to decentralized energy
technologies." 6 However, one risk to be considered is the potential impact on
nascent local industries that are using "tried and true" technologies." 7 Destruction
of those industries could "place a significant brake on development," according to
African NGOs. is
Examples of successful projects include a pilot project that installed
photovoltaic systems in Ugandan rural villages."l 9 The project, designed to
counter a trend toward increasing, inefficient use of diesel generators, reduced
GHG emissions below a fossil-fuel baseline. 120 The project also reduced the
country's national dependence on imported oil, which was consuming an undue
share of Uganda's foreign exchange earnings. 121 A government subsidy enhanced
development opportunities for otherwise non-competitive local industries
producing related products such as22 batteries, and thereby promoted national
development along sustainable lines.'

113. See Section IV(A), infra, for discussion of Anil Agarwal's argument that the CDM tends to
lock m low-tech fossil fuel technologies.
114. ENERGY AFTER RIO, supra note 104, at § 4.2.3; Odingo's Report: Why CDM Needs Africa,

http://www.cseindia.org/html/cmp/climate/ew/
at
30,
2002,
October
WATCH,
EQUITY
ew-oct30/odingo.htm [hereinafter Odingo's report].
115. See A CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 99, at 2.2; DEPARTMENT OF
METEOROLOGY, MINISTRY OF WATER, LANDS, AND ENVIRONMENT, CAPACITY BUILDING IN CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM IN UGANDA (FINAL REPORT), Report Section 5 and Annex B, at

http://www.uccee.org/CDM/CDMCapacityBuildUganda.pdf (June 2001) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Uganda Report].
list of African development priorities formulated at Energy and
116. This is one factor in
Development Research Centre of the University of Capetown. Spalding-Fecher etal., supra note 69, at
64.
117. ENDA, FROM JOINT IMPLEMENTATION TO THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM: SHOULD
AFRICAN POSITIONS CHANGE AFTER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL? § 2, at http://www.enda.sn/energie/cc/

cdm.htm (n.d., last visited Mar. 23, 2004) (on file with author).
118. Id.
119. Uganda Report, supra note 115, at § 5and Annex B.
120. Id §§ 5.1- 5.2, Annex B.
121. Id. § 5.1.

122. Id. at Annex B.
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Rural villages' current reliance on biomass fuel provides another obvious
opportunity to use the CDM to promote energy development along an
"ecodevelopment" pathway. 123 The United Nations Development Programme
notes that there are "[a]dvanced biomass power technologies now under
commercial development" that could use the residues from plantation agriculture
to produce electricity for adjacent rural areas. 124 Biomass power projects have
frequently failed m the past because of maintenance problems caused by excessive
tar formation.'25 However, biogas technology has recently improved in this
respect. 126 The modem version can meet rural power demands for water-pumping,
for example, at a lower
cost than would be achieved by connecting the area to the
27
national power grid.1
There might be a further, largely psychological benefit to renewable fuel
technologies. There is a historical relation between fossil-fuel consumption and
prosperity; the mmdset that presumes a necessary relation drives resistance to
greenhouse gas reduction. To dislodge the kind of resistance that is based on fears
of reduced lifestyles, it is necessary to find a way to "disconnect" increased
prosperity from increased consumption of fossil fuels.1i2 The renewable-fuel
technologies do just that.
Whichever energy-development route they select, however, Africans must
consider a web of economic and environmental issues. For example, farming is
the predominant livelihood m Africa and the most obvious route to food security
for a rising population.29 However, increasing reliance on agriculture contributes
to deforestation and soil exhaustion as more and more land is cleared and
traditional practices of fallowing the land are abandoned. 30 The farming
population also makes heavy use of wood and other biomass fuels, which
contributes further to deforestation and desertification. 13 Excessive reliance on
biomass fuels intensifies flooding and erosion and can deter other development
projects.i32
It is not a simple matter of staving off agricultural decline by implementing
modem energy projects, particularly the large-scale coal technology programs that
some powerful foreign investors will be selling via the CDM or domestic export
policies. Much of the African soil is thin and poor, and a battle is already pitched
against drought, famine, and desertification.133 African soils are also "sensitive to

123.
124.
125.
126.

Energy and Ecodevelopment, supranote 2.
ENERGY AFTER RiO, supra note 104, at § 4.2.2.
Id. § 3.3.2.6.
Id.

127. Id.

128. Energy and Ecodevelopment, supranote 2, at 5.
129. See Udombana supra note 11, at 315 (discussing African countries' dependence on
agriculture).
130. NOTE ON IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 13, at § 1.2; Energy in Sub-SaharanAfrica, supra note
83, at § 1.3.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Udombana, supra note 11, at 315 n.136, citing ECONOMIC CoMMissioN FOR AFRiCA,
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acidification." 134 Coal-fired power plants would exacerbate damage caused by
acidification because they emit135more pollutants that contribute to acid ram than do
plants powered by other fuels.
It is also not possible to simply defer consideration of global warming to deal
with these more pressing problems. Studies by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change suggest that Africa's future under global warming is one of lower
gram yields, less rainfall, decreased availability of water, more disease, accelerated
136
desertification, loss of coastal settlements, and intensified droughts and floods.
The additional stress due to global warmmg would further erode the African
agricultural sector's capacity to provide food security or export dollars to fund
economic development. 137
Any reduction in agricultural exports will also mtensify an already crippling
debt crisis that was fueled by the high interest rates of the 1980s and compounded
by declining commodity prices and counter-productive Structural Adjustment
Programs.' 38 Added to the mix of complicating economic factors is the fossil fuel
industry's status as a major employer m Africa. 139 Developing countries with a
high poverty level naturally wish to protect existing jobs. One viewpoint is that
requests for employment-sensitive alternative-energy projects under the CDM
might drive up project costs to such an extent that they would deter the
investment. 14° However, there is another, more optimistic view that seeking
projects such as advanced biomass energy production would create jobs m a
manner that is painless to the investor.14 ' The theory is that such projects would
naturally and cost-effectively generate a fair number ofjobs related to the growing
and processing of biomass crops, 142 as well as a vastly greater number and variety
of jobs related to an across-the-board migration of mdustry to rural areas with
competitive biomass electricity. 143 Successful biomass projects would create an
ECONOMiC REPORT ON AFRICA 2001: TRACKING PERFORMANCE AND PROGRESS 33 (2002). This note
states that as of 2000, "[56%] of Africans--431 million people-depended on agriculture for their
livelihoods.
134. Gareth Porter, Pollution Standards and Trade: The "EnvironmentalAssimilative Capacity
Argument, 4 GEO. PUBLIC POL'Y REv. 49, 54 (1998).
135. See, e.g., COAL. AMERICA'S PAST, supra note 78, at 2.
136. Richard Wolfson, Stephen H. Schneider, Understanding Climate Science, in CLIMATE
CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at 36, citingthe Technical Summary of IPCC 2001b.
137. See id.
138. Commodity prices began to rebound in 2002, particularly for petroleum-exporting countries.
See U.N.E.C.A. ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 28, supra note 10. For concise description of the
negative impacts of Structural Adjustment Programs implemented by international financial institutions,
see Udombana, supra note 11, at 313-17.
139. Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 70. As modem methods of mechanized coal mining
are introduced in developing countries, this status is likely to change. See AMERICAN COAL
FOUNDATION,

How

COAL

Is

PRODUCED,

at

http://www.ket.org/Tnps/Coal/AGSMM/agsmmproduced.html (on file with author).
140. See Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 70 (noting the employment benefits of the fossil
fuel industry in general).
141. ENERGY AFTER Rio, supra note 104, at § 4.2.2.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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expanded rural tax base capable of financing local infrastructure projects and
stemming the flood of migration to the cities.4
Nevertheless, at least a part of Africa's energy development path will consist
of investment m large-scale, conventional power plants because a regional
electricity grid has been identified as "one of the most important tools for
improving access to commercial energy while reducing environmental impact
[from existing, crude methods of biomass combustion]." 45 A regional energy
infrastructure also would create economies of scale that would reduce the
transaction costs and increase the economic competitiveness of small countries. 46
One debatable assumption is that a regional grid and institutional capacity to
oversee power trading and distribution would create free mtra-regional trade in
energy, in turn allowing southern African countries to substitute hydropower for
the environmentally "dirty" coal-fired electricity from South Africa. 147
Viable African institutions are necessary to build energy capacity and energy
trading systems and to achieve regional cooperation on energy standards and
technology development. 14 Some form of regional organization is necessary to
carry out the goal of building a regional electricity grid. 149 The lack of African
infrastructure also drives up transaction costs and drives investors away from the
region."10 Moreover, many CDM projects involve experimental technology, which
requires a high degree of institutional capacity and subject matter expertise to
oversee the project's implementation. i51 Without a decision-making infrastructure
of its own, the country might be saddled with an intrusive level of oversight from
outside agencies. 152
Institution building is in part a matter of national pride and sovereignty. Thus
far, the lack of a bureaucratic and financial infiastructure has hampered even the
development of an African" position and the promotion of African interests

144. Id.
145. Spalding-Fecher etai., supra note 69, at 66.
146. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament-Energy Cooperation with the Developing Countries, COM(2002)0408 final,
available
at
http://europa.eu.mt/smartapi/cgi/sgadoc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber
&lg--en&typedoc=COMfinal&an_doc=2002&nu_doc='408
(discussing strategies for introducing
clean coal technology from the EU to the African countries).
147 Spalding-Fecher et ai., supra note 69, at 66. It has not worked out that way in the United
States, where the market share of coal-fired power from the oldest dirtiest plants has increased because
it tends to be cheaper, particularly m a deregulated market and
context of low environmental
regulation. JOHN COEQUYT, ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP & REBECCA STANFIELD, U.S. PUBLIC
INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, UP IN SMOKE: CONGRESS' FAILURE TO CONTROL EMISSiONS FROM COAL

POWER PLANTS 9 (July 1999) [hereinafter uP IN SMOKE], at http://www.ewg.org/pub/home
/reports/upinsmoke/pr.html (on file with author).
148. Spading-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 64.
149. Id. at 66.
150. Id. See also Reimund Schwartze, Activities Implemented Jointly, in CLIMATE CHANGE
POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at 293-304.
151. Boiling Point, supra note 7 1, at 79.
152. Id.
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during the climate change negotiations. i 3 The lack of African influence on the
Kyoto Protocol agenda
might reflect its minimal presence and resources in the
1 54
negotiation process.
The concepts of African economic unity and institutional development have
been inseparable since the Organization of African Unity was formed in 1963 to
assume control over African development m the aftermath of colonization. 155 An
African vision of economic unity has evolved through a 1991 Treaty Establishing
the African Economic Community (AEC). 156 This treaty created a new African
entity, the African Union, modeled on the European Union. 57 The constitutive act
for the African Union, which entered into force m 2001, provides for a new
institutional infrastructure for African economic cooperation and regional energy
development. iSS
IV DEFECTS IN THE CDM AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FROM THE AFRICAN
PERSPECTIVE

Among the most problematic features of the CDM are its additionality
criteria, which require project developers to demonstrate that they will go beyond
the busmess-as-usual development scenario. The primary additionality criterion is
"environmental additionality"" the project must reduce GHG emissions below the
baseline level.1 5 9 This requirement is made explicit m Kyoto Protocol Article
12.160 A "financial additionality" criterion, widely understood to be implicit in
Article 12, requires that project developers tap supplemental sources of funding;
the CDM project may not divert Official Development Aid or other government
aid from other types of development projects. 16 ' A proposed criterion of
153. Dr. Albert Mumma, The Poverty of Africa's Position at the Climate Change Convention
Negotiations, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 181, 202-03 (2000/2001).

154. Whereas the developed countries could support their negotiating requests at the various
Conferences of the Parties (COPs) with extensive research from private and public think tanks as well
as side events, booths, and daily newsletters, the African countries typically had between two and four
delegates due to financial constraints and were not asked to speak at panels or side events organized by
others Id.
155. Corinne A. Packer & Donald Rukare, CurrentDevelopments: The New Afrtican Union and Its
ConstitutiveAct, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 365, 366-67 (2002).

156. Id. at 369-70.
157. Id.

158. Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, at http://www.oauoau.orgfLOME2000/introductoryriotenote.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2004); Organization of African
Unity, Press Release 52/2001, The Constitutive Act of the African Union Attains the Legal
Requirement for Entering into Force (Apr. 27, 2001), at http://www.oau-oau.org (last visited Mar. 18,
2004) The Act establishes number of committees, including one that integrates several subjects
relevant to developing an African policy for the CDM: the Committee on Industry, Science and
Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment. See Packer & Rukare, supra note 128, at
375-76.
159 Kyle W. Danish and Jonathan C. Rotter, Drafting Contractsfor Greenhouse Gas Offset
Projectsin Developing Countries, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 168, 170 (2001).

160. Kyoto Protocol, supranote 3, at art. 12(5)(c).
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"investment additionality" would exclude high-profit projects that are likely to
occur m the business-as-usual scenario, without the added inducement of CER
credits.1 62 Also pertinent is "technological additionality, which would require
developers to make a new technology transfer to the host country 6 and
institutional additionality, a requirement that CDM projects go beyond the host
country's ongoing government programs.64
A. CounterproductiveEnvironmentalAdditionality CriterionandBaseline Issues
The criterion of environmental additionality is the problematic one from the
perspective of the African countries. This requirement creates an unintended
incentive for CDM investors to "bypass" the poorest countries that are most in
need of development and most in danger of developing via the cheapest, most
pollution-intensive means.i65 The bypass effect results from the market-based
nature of the CDM, which prompts private corporations to invest in CDM projects
where they see high opportunity and low riski66 m other words, "fast and cheap"
emission-reducton credits. 167 In practice, tlus means that CDM projects will be
clustered in developing countries, such as China and India, that have already
developed along a traditional fossil-fuel pathway- such countries have a substantial
emission problem that can be easily improved with technology that is readily
available to the developer and would require little or no investment in research and
development.
Countries where GHG emissions are low because development is
still nascent are not rewarded for the opportunity for innovation that they offer;
rather, they are effectively locked out of the process.69 This is particularly true of
the African countries other than South Africa, which have minimal fossil fuel
infrastructure and customer base, as evidenced by the lowest fossil-fuel
MECHANISM 2 (2000), at http://www.centre-cired.fr/archives/articles/2000/JCH-Toman.PDF (2002)
[hereinafter CDM Policy Workshop] (on file with author). This document summarizes discussions thai
occurred in a multinational workshop on the CDM, September 24-25, 1999.
162. Danish & Rotter, supra note 159, at 170.
163. Id. This concept has been applied in various ways by host countries determining whether to
participate m CDM project. Some have required a transfer of state-of the-art technology. See DECON
MBH ET AL., CLIMATE PROTECTION PROGRAMME, CDM IN THE FIELD OF RENEWABLE ENERGIES IN
MOROCCO 2, at http://www.gtz.de/climate/publications/projects/CDM-Marocco-Kurz-engi.pdf

(Oct.

2001).
164. S. Brown, et al., Issues and Challengesfor Forest-Based Carbon-Offset Projects: A Case
Study of the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project in Bolivia § 4, 5 MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION
STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 99-121,

at http://www.winrock.org/GENERAL/Publications/

CarbonIssues.pdf (2000). This criterion has also been defined in a less ambitious way, as the transfer of
technology that is the "best available, and practicable for a country's environment, environmentally safe
and sound technology. See F THOMAS, S. ULLRICH, CDM FACT-SHEET FOR DECisIONMAKERS 3, at
http://www.europarl.eu.tnt/workshop/Kyoto/docs/ierfactshetdemaken.doc (2002).
165. A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 386.
166. A CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 99, at § 3.1.
167. A Southern Perspective,supra note 22, at 386.
168. Id. See also Youba Sokona & Djimmgue Nanasta, The Clean Development Mechanism: An
African Delusion? 54 CHANGE 8-11 (Oct.-Nov. 2000), http://www.enda.sn/energie/cc/cdm-afnc.htm
(last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
169. A Southern Perspective,supranote 22, at 386.
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170
consumption rate in the world, at only 2-3% of the global rate.

This situation is not likely to change under the CDM if a pilot program for
Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) is any guide) 71 Under this program, the
forerunner of the CDM, Africa garnered only twelve out of 156 pilot investment
projects. 172 This investment deficit is largely a matter of perceived risk. Africa's
abysmal rate of foreign direct investment (FDI), already the lowest in the world
due to the low purchasing power of its small markets, has now shifted into a
declining mode because of warfare in the region and perceptions of high political
risk. 173 Corporations tend to perceive lower investment risk if the host country is a
"known quantity" due to ongoing investment relationships. 174 However, Africa
does not benefit from this perceptual phenomenon because of its low rate of FDI.
One proposed African solution to the lack of incentive for international
corporate investment under existing norms, is to measure environmental
1
additionality in terms of emissions avoided rather than emissions reduced. 75
Whereas the existing model rewards investors for "cleaning up" fossil-fuel power
plants, an avoidance approach would reward Investments that bypass the fossil fuel
mode of development entirely 176 This approach would promote a technological
"leapfrog effect" (as yet largely theoretical), in which an undeveloped country is
able to adopt clean energy technologies at the outset of development and thereby
avoid the environmental and public-health impacts of fossil fuel use and the costs
of retrofitting existing facilities as the country's environmental standards
mature. 177 The avoided-emissions approach might be the only feasible method of
integrating Africa into the Kyoto Protocol, in view of its exceptionally low levels

170. Id.
171. Under the Climate Change Convention, the UNFCCC Secretariat launched a trial program for

North-South cooperation in GHG reduction, the Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) program. This
program was launched at the First Conference of the Parties (COP 1), in Decision 5/CP.I (Apr. 7,
1995), availableat http://unfccc.int/program/coop/aij/dec5cp.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2004). See also
Abeeku Brew-Hammond, DesigningEnergy Projectsin Africa for the Clean Development Mechanism,
in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, supra note 5, at 75, 76.
172. See list of AIJ Projects at UNITED NATIONS, ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED JOINTLY (Feb. 12,
2002), at http://unfeec.mt/program/coop/ij/aijproj.htm (UNFCCC website, last visited Mar. 24, 2004).
See also Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 67, Brew-Hammond, supra note 173, at 76, and
Suraje Dessai, Air and Atmosphere: The Fifth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change: An Advancement or Derailment of the Process, 1999
COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L L. Y.B. 192, 199 (2000) for descriptions of the problem at an earlier stage of the
program.
173. U.N.E.C.A. ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA, supra note 10, at 28-29 (2003). To some extent,
the high investment risk might be more matter of perception than reality. According to the United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa, "African countries have the highest rate of return on
investment in the world-four times more than in the G-7 countries, twice more than in Asia, and two-

thirds more than in Latin America. Id.
174. A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 386.
175. WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA?, supra note 40, at § 2.2.
176. Id.
177 Richard L. Ottmiger & Rebecca Williams, Renewable Energy Sources for Development, 32
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 331, 354 (2002).
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of GHG emissions due to its current state of underdevelopment.

178

Another proposed solution is to establish quotas for CDM investment, in the
1
hope of equalizing investment opportunities among the developing countries. 79
These quotas might be regional (i.e., one-third for Africa), or economically based
(i.e., one-third to the least-developed countries).180 The problem with the quota
system is that if the profit picture is not to their liking, investors can simply invest
outside of the CDM.
Under any approach, the project sponsors must establish a baseline, the
business-as-usual scenario that serves as the basis for calculating emission
avoidance or reduction. 18 ' Establishing a baseline is particularly difficult if the
host country has only a sketchy institutional capacity to measure current emissions,
gauge future economic growth, and develop a coherent and credible energy policy
that would establish a trajectory for future emissions. 82 Another baseline issue that
is specific to the energy section is the treatment of ongoing improvements in
power-plant efficiency. m3 Investment in more efficient power generation is a
standard economic development strategy- by increasing the amount of power
generated per unit of fuel, the developing country reduces costs and perhaps allows
the plant operator to get by on a lower grade of fuel. 184 The effect of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions might be an incidental one; thus, in terms of the
Protocol's main goal of reducing GHG emissions, it might be counterproductive to
reward such projects under the CDM. 85 According to one (non-African)
commentator, if the CDM is used to fund a technology that would have been
adopted anyway via an econormc development strategy, the CDM will become
"merely a tool for resource transfer rather than a tool for reducing emissins."'186
Suggested solutions for the "mere resource transfer" issue include a
heightened efficiency baseline for CDM projects, which would enable decisionmakers to distinguish between GHG-reduction projects and standard development
projects.!81 However, this heightened baseline also comes with an unintended
social cost-it is likely to crowd out local technology developers who lack the
resources of the more efficient multinational corporations.'"

178. WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA?, supranote 40, at § 2.2.
179. Id. § 5.1.
180. Id.
181. Gray E. Taylor, Global Climate Change Agreements-Do the Storm Clouds Have Silver
Lining?, 45 ROCKY MT. MiN. L. INST. § 2.03[21[a][il (1999).
182. See Mumma, supra note 153, at 200-201. See also R.S. Maya & John Turkson, CDM
Baseline and Additionality in the African Context-The Issues, in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE
CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, supranote 5,at 19-33.
183. Boiling Point, supra note 71, at 79.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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B. InequitableAssignment ofEmission Credits
A particular sore point among many developing countries is their restricted
role in the market for trading emission-reduction credits, an opportunity that has
evolved from the emissions-trading and jomt-tmplementation mechanisms.189 The
primary function of emission reduction credits is to offset the emission-reduction
obligations of countries subject to the emissions cap; developing countries, which
are not subject to the cap, might seem to be excluded almost by definitionse
However, the developing countries, which can obtain credits only through the
CDM process, do not wish to be restricted to a limited secondary market.' 9' The
credit trading market is a profit-making opportunity, and many developing
countries view emission rights and the attendant tradable credits
as "de facto
92
property rights" in which they should be allowed to share freely.
One possible approach is to distribute credits among all states, including the
developing countries. At several points in the Kyoto-implementation process, the
African delegation proposed a plan to allocate emission rights on a per-capita
basis. 193 The per-capita approach reflects the view that all of the world's citizens
have an equitable right to share equally in the right to use the atmosphere.' 94 A
premise of the per-capita rights proposal is a theory of gradual "contraction and
convergence, in which the developed countries currently using more than their
share of the atmosphere's assimilative capacity will progressively reduce their
emissions while the underdeveloped regions such as Africa would increase their
emissions until they achieved a comparable state of economic development' 9
This approach is frequently associated with an invocation of historical patterns of
overproduction of greenhouse gases. 196
Another African proposal goes further, suggesting an allotment "based on the
Poverty Index, reflecting the country's need to develop (i.e., the poorer the
country, the higher the assignment)."' 197 In accordance with its position in favor of
an avoidance criterion, the African countries also suggest that the98 credit allotment
be based on "emissions foregone" rather than emission reduction.
A different kind of alternative is to allocate a share of the CERs generated by
189. A CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supranote 99, at § 3.1.

190. Boiling Point,supra note 71, at 79.
191. Id.
192. JEAN-PHILIPPE THOMAS, YUOBA SOKONA & STEPHEN HuMPHREYs, ENDA TIERS MONDE

PROGRAMME, AFTER BuENOs AIREs: A DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT NGO PERSPECTIVE 2

(Feb.

1999), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/19/2059382.pdf [hereinafter After Buenos Aires]; A
CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supranote 99, at § 3.1.
193. This proposal was raised at the seventh ad hoc working group on the Berlin Mandate, which

met in Bonn in 1997, and again after the 1998 Buenos Aires conference of the parties. After Buenos
Aires, supra note 192; Boiling Point,supra note 71, at 55.
194. See, e.g., A Southern Perspective,supranote 22, at 387- Baer, supranote 17, at 393, 401.

195. Boiling Point, supra note 71, at 55, citing Rungano Karamanzera, Zimbabwean delegate to
AGBM-7.
196. A Southern Perspective,supra note 22, at 402.
197. Mumma, supranote 153, at 203-05.
198. Id. at 206-07.
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a CDM project to the host state. 199 This approach has been characterized as a
tradeoff between cash and CERs; the potential problem is that a host country that
demands a share of the project CERs would simply induce the investor to cut back
on the monetary benefits it will offer. 2° Perhaps a more promising suggestion is to
allow the developing country to fund CDM projects and earn the CERs as an
investor.20 ' This approach would permit the developing countries to tailor CDM
projects to their own development agenda.20 2
Moreover, with the added
inducement of the CERs, African infrastructure projects could become more
attractive and affordable to cash-strapped African countries. 20 3 Another creative
suggestion is to distribute CERs as a reward domestic policy changes that create
sustainable development, even if the policy's GHG-reduction effect is
mcidental. 2°4
C. Insufficient Emphasis on Emission Reductions in the Developed Countries
Like many other developing countries, the African countries propose that
developed countries meet a greater share of their emissions-reduction obligations
at home. As formulated by African NGO groups,
This issue extends beyond the UNFCCC, whose global reduction objectives
cannot in any case be reached solely through application of the Kyoto Protocol
and its flexibility mechanisms (i.e., least cost reduction). At best the mechanisms
should be considered as instruments to assist a20variety
of societies to transit
5
towards low carbon energy and economic systems.
In addition to the safety valve offered by the flexible mechanisms, there are
several loopholes in the Kyoto Protocol that allow developed countries to
minimize their obligation to reduce their domestic emissions. For example, the
Protocol addresses a combination of six greenhouse gases. 206 Some of these gases
also qualify as ozone-depleting gases, which emitters are already obligated to
phase out under the Montreal Protocol. 20 7 Developed countries also may buy "hot
air" credits from Eastern European countries that are currently m economic decline
and whose baseline levels are therefore unrealistic, and cheap CDM credits from
the developing world, and bank them on a long-term basis to postpone the need to
reduce fossil fuel emissions. 0 8
Forcing wealthy developed countries to make more domestic reductions

199. CDM Policy Workshop, supra note 161, at 4.
200. Id.
201. Id.

202. Id.
203. See id.
204. Id.
205. After Buenos Aires, supra note 192, at § 1(c).
206. The six greenhouse gases covered by Protocol are carbon dioxide (CO 2), methane, nitrous
oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, and sulfur hexaflounde. Kyoto Protocol, supranote 3, at Annex A.
207. Boiling Point, supra note 71, at 65.
208. A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 77-78.
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would tend to promote an earlier commercialization of non fossil-fuel energy
technology- such countries would have little choice but to regulate their coal-fired
power plants more stringently and to redirect subsidies to low-emitting renewable
fuels. 209 An increased subsidization of alternative energy technologies would in
turn affect the range and cost of technologies available to developing countries
under the CDM.2 l
A greater range of commercial, low-polluting energy technologies would fit
in well with African environmental policies, which are stringent but are not yet

backed up by strong enforcement capabilities. On a political level, African
solutions for environmental problems have been emphatically progressive ones
environmentally, and have included the Bamako Convention, which took a strong
stand against the transport of unwanted hazardous waste into Africa, and the Lagos
Plan of Action, 1980, which formulated a plan for environmentally sound, regional
economic development. 21 ' Africa, like other developing areas, does not want to be
a haven or dumping ground for emission-intensive industries.
There are historical and current bases for the fear of becoming a "dumping
ground." Developed countries have a history of exporting their pollution-intensive
industries and less efficient technology to developing countries with lower
environmental standards.2i 2 Africa might well assume the role of a pollution haven
in the energy sector as the expected explosive growth of this sector in developing
countries creates an increasingly "powerful incentive" to relocate coal technology
to countries that have weak enforcement standards or capabilities and are not
subject to the Kyoto emissions cap.213 Once a capital-intensive coal Infrastructure
is built, it tends to remain in place for many, many decades; thus, such transfers
have the potential to undermine local preferences and saddle the developing
countries with expensive, outmoded, pollution-intensive energy technology that
will constrain their environmental choices for years.2i 4
D. Mismatch Between CDMand African Development Priorities
Key concern of African countries are whether the CDM can contribute to their
sustainable development and the degree to which CDM projects fit the country's
209. See, e.g., COAL. AMERICA'S PAST, AMERICA'S

FUTURE,

supra note 147, at 2, stating that coal

plants account for 76% of the CO2 emissions of the electric utility industry. See also
GLOBAL

WARMING

&

ENERGY:

THE

GLOBAL

WARMING

GREENPEACE,
CONNECTION
at

http://www.greenpeaceusa.orgelimate/energytext.htm; Berger, supra note 21, at 411 et seq.
210. See the discussion in Section V(B), mfra, for further reasons why the developing countries
advocate a greater emphasis on domestic reductions in the developed countries.
211. Packer & Rukare, supra note 155, at 366. The Bamako Convention, 30 I.L.M. 775 (1991),
requires the Parties to "promote clean production methods, to favor pollution prevention over pollution
reduction, and to consider the environmental costs of the mining phase of production. DAVID HUNTER,
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

879 (Foundation Press 1998).

212. Cheng, supra note 7, at 63, 65.
213. See Alex G. Hanafi, Note: Joint Implementation: Legal and Institutional Issues for an
Effective International Program to Combat Climate Change, 22 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 441, 471-72
(1998) (contrasting joint implementation with implementation solely in the developed countries).
214. See UP IN SMOKE, supra note 147, regarding the U.S. expenence; Cheng, supra note 7, at 63.
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unique economic and social development agendas.215 The CDM requires
"voluntary participation" by each party, and the developed countries maintain that
voluntary participation is enough to assure that a CDM investor will respect the
developing country's sustainable development strategy 216
However, the
Protocol's emphasis on sustainable development m accordance with local
preferences might well be compromised by the large role given to private
investors, who are not bound by Article 10's requirement that "parties" take
regional development priorities into account.
Moreover, the current African investment situation does not provide the
bargaining leverage to ensure the desired "African solutions for African
problems. 217 Already passed over by most foreign investors, African countries
are competing for investment on an investor's terms. 2 1 The CDM, with its
project-by-project approach also tends to relegate host countries to a relatively
passive "take-it-or-leave it" role.219 In combination,
such financial pressures could
220
easily undermine a people's ability to say "no.
Africans also seem to sense an impending necessity to fend off antidevelopment pressures from enviromnentalists. 22l The regional New Partnership
for Africa's Development (NEPAD) plan for development of the African energy
sector envisions the development of a fossil fuel infrastructure for natural gas
power generation, including gas pipelines and gas-fired power plants. 222 The
vision entails a full exploitation Africa's rich oil and gas resources for the benefit
of African consumers, and is designed to relieve poverty by "guaranteeing a
sustainable supply of affordable energy."
Noting that the Climate Change
Convention does not require developing countries to subordinate their priority
goals of economic development and poverty eradication to the goal of GHG
reduction, they anticipate that they will be obliged to "find ways [to avoid]

215. Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 67.
216. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 12(5)(a); PaperNo. 6, Responses to G77/ChnaQuestions
on Flexibility Mechanisms, MATTERS RELATED TO DECISION I/CP.3 PARAGRAPH 5 (Activities
Implemented Jointly) (A Compilation of Submissions by Parties), FCCC/CP/I998/rmsc.7, COP 4, at
http://unfccc.mt/resource/docs/cop4/miscO7.htm (Oct. 5, 1998).
217 Packer& Rukare, supra note 155, at 366-67
218. See Udombana, supra note 11, at 306.
219. Lucia Schild Ortiz, Mark Lutes & Rubens Born, Ringside 111: Not So Clean, EQUITY WATCH
(October 30, 2002), at http://www.cseindia.org/htmllcmp/climate/ew/ewoct30/clean.htm.
220. See CDM Policy Workshop, supra note 161, at 3, which also notes the negative influence of
corruption.
221. See, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 49, at 849.
222. NEPAD, Executive Summary [Draft], SHORT-TERM ACTION PLAN: INFRASTRUCTURE § 2,
http:/lwww.csir.co.za/akani/2004/Mar/pdfs/nepad_actioninfra-pdf
(May 2002). NEPAD is an
organization that promotes regional economic cooperation among African states. For a discussion of
implementation of the SHORT-TERM ACTION PLAN, see NEPAD INFRASTRUCTURE SHORT-TERM
ACTION PLAN (STAP): REvIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS AND THE WAY FORWARD (May 2003),
at http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000652/NEPADInfrastructure_May2003.pdf.
223. NEPAD, Executive Summary [Draft], SHORT-TERM ACTION PLAN: INFRASTRUCTURE, supra
note 222, at § 2. This vision of sustainable development is quite similar to that of the international coal
industry. See the definition of Ron Knapp, supra note 1, at 1.
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measures that are contrary to their interest, i.e., that impede their development. 224
The current economic distress of most African countries is caused in part by
the export of about 80% of Africa's oil to fuel economic activity in other countries
and pay off massive debts to banks in the developed world. 22 This export pattern
is in turn linked to an increasing mvestment-related pollution problem in Africa.226
Massive indebtedness makes it Impossible for African countries to invest in
improving their environment, and the resulting lower environmental standards
create an incentive for developed countries to export their most pollution-intensive
industries and technologies to African and other developing countries. 22 7 The
situation has been characterized as the poor countries' subsidy of economic
development and environmental improvement in the wealthy industrialized
countries. 228
The current African development plan to develop Africa's fossil-fuel
resources for the benefit of African countries is supported by several U.N.
resolutions designed to end the economic disadvantages of colomalism and neocolonialism, particularly Resolution 1803, which affirms a developing country's
permanent sovereignty over its natural resources. 229 The position of the African
countries also finds some support in Kyoto Protocol Article 10, which sets forth
the development obligations of the developing countries and specifies that the
GHG-reduction agenda will take account of national and regional development
priorities. Article 10, when read in conjunction with Article 12, which provides for
the CDM, appears to confer a right to choose the fuel and energy technology most
appropriate to a country's economic agenda, so long the subset of projects that
seek CERs would reduce GHG emissions below a business-as-usual baseline.
Clearly "clean coal" technology is an option both under a country's general
development policy and under the CDM, even if another technology would
facilitate a greater reduction.230
If the selection of fuels and energy technologies were made entirely on the
basis of logic and developmental criteria, it would be driven in large part by the
local mix of available fuels.73' In Sub Saharan Africa, biomass is currently the
224. NOTE ON IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 13, at § 1.1.
225. Energy In Sub SaharanAfrica, supranote 83, at 6.

226. Cheng, supra note 7, at 59.
227. Id. at 61; Udombana, supra note 11, at 305-18.
228. Cheng, supra note 7, at 61.
229. United Nations Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, U.N.G.A. Res.
1803 (XVII), reprinted in 2 L.L.M. 223 (1963). For discussion of the developed countries' GHG
emissions policies as a form ofenvironmental imperialism, see, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 49, at 849-50.
230. The prevalence of lower environmental standards and priorities in the developing countries
has fueled a "meaningful participation" debate in the developed countries. The implicit assumption is
that countries whose development policies entail lower environmental standards will overwhelm the
emissions cutbacks of developed countries. Critics from the developed world note that emissions
anywhere have a global impact, and suggest that a failure to create comparable restrictions on the
developing countries' emissions and policy choices could render "American concessions
completely
ineffectual. Thomas et al., supra note 34, at 173.
231. See Jae Edmonds, Atmospheric Stabilization: Technology Needs, Opportunities,and Timing,
U.S.
POLICY
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE:
WHAT
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53
(Aspen
Institute
2002),
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dominant fuel.232 There is limited access to traditional commercial energy sources
such as oil, gas, and hydropower, which are localized and require substantial
infrastructure for delivery. 233 Sunlight is abundant everywhere, but there are
financial barriers to developing a solar energy industry 2 34 Coal is currently mined
primarily in South Africa, but there are plans to develop coal deposits m other
areas and build coal-fired power plants to diversify and unprove the reliability of
the continent's energy supply and promote use of local resources. 3 However, in
the absence of sophisticated and expensive technology (a potential incentive for a
CDM investment), coal emits 23substantially
more greenhouse gases and other
6
pollutants than most other fuels.
V THE FRAMEWORK

OF THE LARGER EQUITY DEBATE: DEVELOPED

v

DEVELOPING

WORLDS

Kyoto's unique approach is of unique interest to fossil fuel industries because
it unplicates them in both the problem and the solution to climate change. C0 2 is
the greenhouse gas of most crucial concern in the context of the effort to achieve a
sustainable global industrialization. 37 Fossil fuels, particularly
coal, have been
238
targeted as the "primary source" of industrial CO 2 emissions.
Some CO 2 -reduction strategies are particularly galling to the fossil fuel
industry, such as proposals to finance the development of the industry's
competitors by pollution taxes, remove fossil fuel subsidies, create incentives for
consumers to switch to renewable fuels, and redirect government aid to the
renewable fuel industry 239 Another proposal (now defunct) was to end the Clean
Air Act exemptions enjoyed by certain coal-fired power plants in the United
States. 2 40 Thus, it is not surprising that within the Kyoto Protocol's "carrot-andstick approach," 24 1 it is the "stick" that first caught the industry's eye. The Kyoto
http://www.aspenmstitute.org/aspeninstitute/files/Img/EdmondsEEEClimate.pdf (last visited Mar. 29,
2004).
232. Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 64; Energy in Sub-SaharanAfrica, supra note 83, at
2.
233. Spalding-Fecher, supra note 69, at 64.
234. Id.
235. See INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY
AGENCY,
COAL
IN
AFRICA
N
2001,
at
http://www.ieaorgFextbase/stats/coaldata.asp?country=Afnca&SubmitA--Submit (last visited Mar. 28,
2004) for chart describing coal usage in 2001. See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMiNiSTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2003: COAL (May 1, 2003), availableat
http:lwww.eia.doe.govloaf/ieo/coa.htni, for U.S. projections of coal development in various regions.
236. See, e.g., COAL. AMERICA'S PAST, supra note 78, at 2, describing the disproportionate
contribution of coal-burning power plants to CO2 emissions in the electric utility industry.
237. Jonathan Baert Wiener, DesigningGlobal Climate Change Regulation, in CLIMATE CHANGE
POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at 151, 153-58.
238. Clare Breidinich, Daniel Magraw, Anne Rowley & James W Rubm, Current Developments:
The Kyoto Protocolto the United NationsFramework Convention on Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT'L
L. 315, 317 (1998).
239. See, e.g., Ottinger & Williams, supra note 178, at 359-60; Hanafi, supra note 213, at 460.
240. Mallery, supra note 111, at 471-76.
241. See Glenn Wiser, Kyoto Protocol Packs Powerful Compliance Punch, 25 BNA
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Protocol has generated a war of words between developing and developed
countries,242 with the rhetoric from the developed countries driven in large part by
their fossil fuel industries.243
A. The Developed Countries: U.S. Battlefront
Several major salvos in the battle have come from the United States-a
country that is important because it is poised to become a major exporter of energy
technology and because its refusal to participate might well scuttle the Kyoto
Protocol. 244 The energy industry's viewpoint, reflected early and often in the
United States political system, is that the Protocol would devastate not only the
fossil fuel industry, but all industries that use large amounts of energy or petroleum
products, as well as the workers and local governments that depend on those
industries.245
In 1997 the U.S. Senate unanmously passed a resolution opposing U. S.
participation in any climate change treaty that would harm the U.S. economy or
fail to require "meaningful" participation by developing countries. 2 4
The
resolution was supported by an energy-industry organization, the Global Climate
Coalition, which had previously spearheaded a massive public relations campaign
regarding the competitive
impact of the Protocol's "more favorable" treatment of
247
developing countries.
One hot-button issue for environmentalists is the pervasive presence of
largely "invisible" regulatory subsidies that create a misleading appearance of cost-
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available

at

http://www.ciel.org/Publications/INER-Compliance.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
242. Mallery, supra note 111, at 481.
243. See Hanafi,supra note 213, at 450, citing the position of the Global Climate Coalition, "a U.S.
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See Armin Rosencranz, U.S. Climate Change Policy, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supra
note 6, at 221,221-234, for further discussion and context. The Senate as whole, and the sponsors of
the resolution have had
change of heart. After the Bush Administration cited the Byrd-Hagel
Resolution in rejecting the Kyoto Protocol, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed new
resolution, declaring that Byrd-Hagel should not "cause the U.S. to abandon its shared responsibility to
help find
solution to the global climate change dilemma.
Leome Haimson, Climate Change
Negotiation History, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supranote 6, at 523, 528.
247. See Hanafi, supra note 213, at 450 (citing the Global Climate Coalition "a U.S. consortium
representing largely fossil-fuel business interests, which predicted "massive job losses" and spikes in
the pnce of necessities). Oil industry experts suggested that Kyoto would force a 20% reduction in oil
use and "major lifestyle changes by consumers in the developed countries. Skip Maryan, R. Casey
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effectiveness. 2488 For example, loopholes in the U.S. Clean Air Act confer a
competitive advantage on older coal-burning plants that use outmoded technology
and a competitive disadvantage on other power plants that are subject to newer,
higher environmental standards.249 Such regulatory subsidies promote additional
private and public investment in coal facilities and create a more favorable ratio
between dollars invested and electricity output (investment cost per kWh). 250 This
effect is a potential selling point to developing countries, which can be enhanced
further by government-subsidized technology development. 2 1
Government-subsidized technology development tends to reflect both an
industry export agenda and the global trend toward deregulation of the utility
industries in the developed countries. Coal companies m the developed countries
are well positioned to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the CDM,
due to the increasing consolidation and internationalization of the industry and a
trend to do business through foreign affiliates. 52 Moreover, in response to
deregulation, coal companies, which supply the fuel that currently dominates the
electricity mdustry, 253 seek to reduce their price risk by diversifying their customer
base.2M One way to do this is to export more coal, 55 which has encountered
increasing opposition from environmentalists in developed countries and is now
primarily a local or regional fuel due to high transportation costs. 256 Industry
involvement in developing new technologies that decrease transportation costs and
reduce environmental Impacts helps to promote the export model for coal.257
An export agenda is apparent in the energy-industry cooperation that occurred
248. COAL. AMERICA'S PAST, supranote 78, at 8.
249. UP IN SMOKE, supra note 147, at 10, citing Clean Air Task Force, Testimony of Armond
Cohen, before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy
and Power.
250. See MARSHALL GOLDBERG, FEDERAL ENERGY SUBSIDIES: NOT ALL TECHNOLOGIES ARE
CREATED EQUAL 8-9 (July 2000), a research report produced for the Renewable Energy Policy Project,
at http://www.repp.org/repppubs/articles/resRptll/subsidies.pdf, see also COAL. AMERICA'S PAST,
supra note 78, at 8-9.
251. See, e.g., Robert M. Margolis & Daniel M. Kammen, Energy R&D and Innovation:
Challenges and Opportunities, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at 469, 486 et
seq. For discussion of Australian subsidies, see CHRISTOPHER RIEDY, SUBSIDIES THAT ENCOURAGE
FOSSIL FUEL USE INAUSTRALIA (Institute for Sustainable Futures, Working Paper CR 2003/01, January
2003), at www.isf.uts.edu.au/publications/CR_2003_paper.pdf.
252. CHALLENGES OF ELECTRIC POWER RESTRUCTURING FOR FUEL SUPPLIERS, supra note 253, at

9. See also Energy Information Administration, Chapter 6, Recent Trends in InternationalInvestment
and Trade, in COAL, PRIVATIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY MARKETS, at
http://www.itcilo.it/actrav/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/firane/coal.htm (n.d., last visited May 8,
2004).
253. See, e.g., COAL. AMERICA'S PAST, supra note 78, at 8
254. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, CHALLENGES OF
ELECTRIC
POWER
INDUSTRY
RESTRUCTURING
FOR
FUEL
SUPPLIERS
27,
at

http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/electncity/chg-str-fuel.pdf (Sep. 1998).
255. Id.
256. INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS, supra note 247, at 45. Due to high
transportation costs, only about 13% of hard coal production is traded internationally.
257. Id. At the current rate of technology development, experts do not anticipate a global coal trade
similar to the market for oil will evolve in the foreseeable future for coal. Id.
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after George W Bush was elected to the U.S. Presidencyin 2000. Bush decisively
repudiated the Kyoto Protocol after his election in 2000, citing the Protocol's
impacts on the competitiveness of U.S. industries and the lack of adequate, costeffective technology to reduce GHG emissions. 258 The Bush Administration then
stepped up government funding for coal technologies vis-A-vis the funding for
renewable energy technologies.259 This current emphasis on coal technology
derives both from a policy to reduce dependence on imported oil and an export
agenda: One of President Bush's persistent themes is that coal, which is plentiful in
the U.S., can be used as a primary industrial fuel without causing pollution or
climate change and that the "clean coal" approach should be exported to
developing countries. 26
What is frequently not mentioned is the poor fit between clean coal
technology and the needs of the rural poor in African and other developing
countries. Subsidized fossil fuel technologies do not benefit rural populations that
have little prospects of being connected to a developing country's electrical grid.261
Indeed, it might be "far less costly to subsidize the energy needs of the poor
directly than to subsidize fuels for all users. 262 An ovemding investment in new
fossil fuel technologies also would eliminate the possibility of a beneficial
"leapfrog effect." 263 Subsidizing governments frequently invoke the interests of
the poor, but subsidies to established industries tend to reflect pressures from
privileged sectors of a society seeking cost containment and from companies
seeking to maximize their profits. 2
B. The DevelopingCountries

In response to the developed countries' arguments that they would be unduly
disadvantaged by the Kyoto Protocol and that the CDM is not a sufficient offset to
that disadvantage, the developing countries have fired back several equity-based
arguments that the CDM is unduly favorable to developed countries. They suggest
that the CDM is fundamentally flawed because it allows developed countries to
buy their way out of their obligations to reduce own emissions. 265 The theory is
that the CDM safety valve dissipates the political will to seek
2 6 out less carbonintensive forms of energy development and economic growth. 5
One of the developing countries' most interesting arguments concerns a
258. Rosencranz, supra note 246, at 227; Thomas et al., supra note 34, at 173.
259. COAL. AMERICA'S PAST, supra note 78, at 6-8; Coal Is Central to Energy Policy, Bush Says,
CARE (COALITIoN FOR AFFORDABLE AND RELIABLE ENERGY) (Feb. 15, 2001), at
http://www.careenergy.com/news/articleview.asp?iArticie=36..
260. See Coal Is Central to Energy Policy, Bush Says, CARE (COALITION FOR AFFORDABLE AND
RELIABLE ENERGY) (Feb. 15, 200 1), at http://www.careenergy.com/news/articieview.asp?iArticle=36.
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Ottmger & Williams, supra note 178, at 344.
Id. at 344-45.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 344.

265. See, e.g., A Southern Perspective,supranote 22, at 375.
266. After Buenos Aires, supra note 192, at I(c).
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loophole in the Protocol's technology-forcing scheme. The Kyoto Protocol,
essentially a technology-forcing instrument as well as a social-justice document,
contemplates that the binding GHG caps will force international energy companies
to look for new markets and new ways to enhance their profits, thereby altering
"the future growth and pattern of world energy demand."267
Paradoxically, however, the CDM might actually tend to prevent the global
community from progressing beyond the fossil-fuel technology that has caused the
global warming problem. Because it is structured as a market-driven mechanism,
the CDM directs investment toward projects that minimize cost, effort, and risk for
multinational corporations. 268 The easiest, cheapest emission credits are in simple
technologies, such as coal-washmg, that attempt to clean up fossil-fuel energy
systems. 269 CERs earned by coal washing cost three dollars per tonne; those
earned by creating zero-carbon energy systems cost twelve-to-fifteen dollars per
tonne.270
According to the late Anil Agarwal, a prominent environmental activist from
India, this market reality could lock the developing countries into a fossil-fuel
development path whether they want it or not, and incidentally turn the CDM into
a subsidy to export the most environmentally destructive industries in the
developed world. 271 This fossil fuel lock-m effect might be particularly
detrimental to Africa, where the 95% of the rural population not yet hooked in to a
massive, costly electrical grid is uniquely positioned to benefit from a range of new
energy technologies tailored to a rural environment.2 2 International investment in
the developing country's expansion of a traditional electricity grid directs scarce
funding away from the villages in favor of the urban areas and helps to force the
developed country into the role of a long-term captive fossil-fuel customer.7 3
Absent this lock-in effect,
rural African villages might bypass the antiquated fossil
274
fuel technology entirely.
Another equity issue that zeroes in on the CDM is the "low-hanging friat"
argument: the CDM allows the developed countries to cherry-pick the easiest
options for GHG reduction in the developing countries. 27 5 Later, when the
developing countries have reached relatively high levels of energy efficiency, the
developed countries no longer have any incentive to buy emission credits from
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them due to rising incremental costs. 2 7 6 Nevertheless, further emission reductions
will be required in part because of the developed countries' failure to develop
domestic and CDM technology for GHG reduction, at which point the developing
countries will be left with only the most difficult, expensive options; these will cost
the poor countries up to thirty times more than the credits the wealthy developed
countries purchased to fulfill their own GHG-reduction obligations. 77
A
developed country may bank emission credits without regard to its already high
per-capita rate of largely "luxury" emissions, while developing27countries
with low
8
per-capita "survival" emissions do not have the same privilege.
There is also an intergenerational equity issue. The low-hanging fruit
phenomenon places the developing countries in a position of "discounting their
future" if they take advantage of the CDM. 279 Future generations will have to
make further reductions, at much higher costs, than the costs of the options sold
cheaply to the developed countries. 280 Moreover, the long banking period for
cheap credits could mean, ironically, that the developed countries could still be
using these cheap credits at a tume when the developing countries would be forced
to make higher-priced reductions. 28'
Perhaps most startling equity paradox is a cost-benefit argument sometimes
used to bolster the status-quo fossil-fuel development pattern. 282 According to one
global warming economist, "the total and long-term cost of emitting an extra ton of
carbon today is the equivalent of $7.50"-allegedly far less than the economic
benefit. 283 However, this figure is predicated in part on a country-specific
valuation of the projected loss of life. Lives lost in tropical zones characterized by
a high poverty rate, lower earning capacity, and shorter life spans are assigned a
lower value than the lives in countries such as the U.S., which receive the bulk of
the benefits of fossil fuel combustion. 2" Because a disproportionate number of the
deaths attributable to global warming will occur in such regions, the costs of fossilfuel-based development appear low and "cost-effective." 285 This is the classic
environmental-justice problem.286
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VI. ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

CDM projects may be undertaken either by private corporations or by
government entities; indeed, the involvement of private actors is one of the treaty's
defining features. 28 7 In practice, however, the power to take the initiative will lie
mainly with private corporations, due to a major shift in the nature of capital flows
In recent years, private
from the developed to the developing countries.
investment has become the dominant mode of transfer as official development
assistance (ODA) has declined precipitously. 288 ODA, which comprised 56% of
worldwide financial flows m 1990, had plummeted to 14% by 1996.289 Moreover,
the share of ODA that flows to utilities, energy, and transportation infrastructure
declined from 23% in 1975-80 to 15% in 1995-2000.290 This shift away from
public investment might undermine some of Kyoto Protocol goals given the profitmaking onentation of private investors, the weak governance of multinational
corporations in international law, Africa's relatively weak bargaining position visa-vis these investors, and the weakness of African institutions that might be
expected to exercise control over investors.
In the most general terms, Africa has been disadvantaged thus far by the shift
to a private mode of wealth transfer. Although increased private investment has
more than offset plummeting ODA at a global level,29 1 Africa has not attracted its
share of this capital. 292 In absolute terms, FDI increased in Africa increased
between 1990 and 1996; however, FDI increased far less in Africa than
elsewhere. 293 The increased investment was concentrated m twenty-five to thirty
countries with superior infrastructure and perceived profit potential-and 80%/0
flowed into just twelve developing countries. 294 Africa is essentially running in
place, falling behind other countries because it needs capital to attract capital in an
investment milieu where "globalization is propelled by capital--the potential of a
,295
given stock of assets to deploy new production
The problem is that Africa's small and weak markets "are not attractive to
investors unless there is a longer-term incentive," according to Afican CDM
designers. 296 Thus, Africans are attempting to create CDM opportunities with
some profit potential other than the certified emission reduction credits, projects
with "self-financing capacity" and the ability to attract continued corporate

287. Kyoto Protocol, supranote 3, at art. 12(9).
288. U.N.E.C.A. ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA, supra note 10, at 29-30.
289. Yamm, supra note 36, at 65.
290. U.N.E.C.A. ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA, supra note 10, at 29. This would seem to
minimize the intended effect of the Kyoto Protocol's financial additionality criterion, which theorizes
that CDM projects will not displace ODA.
291. The overall flow of public and private funding has "expanded by 184 percent since 1990"
because of greatly increased corporate investment. Yamn, supra note 36, at 65.
292. See A CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 99, at § 3.1.
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financing of related projects. 29 7 One example is Africa's structural reform of its
energy sector.298 State utilities are being pnvatized on a large scale, and these
under-financed state utilities present opportunities for relatively easy
improvements in efficiency as well as the profit-making lock-m effect identified
by Agarwal. 29
However, this strategy to attract foreign investment might conflict with some
of Africa's other economic development prionties, namely its effort to improve the
lot of the rural poor. It is not cost effective to extend the electrical grid into
sparsely populated areas. Even if traditional grid-style delivery were economically
feasible in rural areas, the desperately poor residents could not afford the power in
a privatized economic environment where citizens must "pay for everything." 3°
Furthermore, when CDM investment is focused on cleaning up an existing
fossil-fuel grid system, there is no guarantee that private investors will provide the
latest technology unless the host country has a strong bargainng system and
stringent emission regulations. There is an unfortunate history of corporate
transfers of outmoded technology that they cannot use at home whenever "it is
cheaper to do so and there3 01are no regulations or supervision to prevent the use of
such harmful technology

This is likely to continue m the African energy development sector because
power plant operators have no incentive for ongomg use of clean coal technologies
unless national regulations raise the cost of emitting carbon and other pollutants
above the cost of using the technology 302 Even if "clean coal" technology is made
available, the African countries might find themselves unable to take advantage of
it. If the Umted States' experience is any guide, a spike in natural gas prices or the
reality of regulatory or other costs of "clean coal" technology will promote an
increased use of "dirty" coal capacity (which currently exist in abundance in South
Africa) and the construction of new facilities that can compete with these "dirty"
facilities' low production costs, rather than expensive "clean coal" facilities. 303
Africa's consumers have little economic clout, and its regulatory enforcement
capacity is low. In the U.S., even with far stronger, more environmentally oriented
consumer markets, it has proved impossible to get power plant operators to use
completely available technology in the absence of the necessary regulatory

297 Timothy Afful-Koomson, Paul Opoku-Mensah, Participatory Implementation and
Governance of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)Projects in Afrtica, in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES
ON THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 35, 37.

298. Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 64.
299. See A CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 99, at § 3.1. See also Back to
Basics, supranote 269, and U.N.E.C.A. REPORT, supra note 10, at 35-36.
300. Udombana, supra note 11, at 316-17.
301. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 47 (Cambridge
University Press 1999) (1994).
302. Can Carbon Sequestration Solve Global Warming? TERRADAILY, Feb. 25, 2003, citing
Howard Herzog, pnncipal research engineer at Massachusetts Institute of Technology Laboratory for
Energy and the Environment, at http://www.spacedaily.com/news/greenhouse-03d.html (last visited
Mar. 24, 2004).
303. UP IN SMOKE, supra note 147, at 4.
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incentives.

°

There is another problematic factor m the international legal framework. One
African scholar has suggested that Africa "has been more acted on than actor,
largely because existing international law norms do not 'bmd states and global
actors to promote the right to development globally' and, in particular, in
Africa. 30 5 There are several international policy documents that instruct
corporations to respect a host country's development priorities. The International
Chamber of Commerce Guidelines for International Investment state that
international investors "[sihould ensure in consultation with the competent
authorities that the investment fits satisfactorily into the economic and social
development plans and priorities of the host country "3 The voluntary OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises state that corporate investors "should take
fully into account" the policies of the host country and "contribute to economic,
social, and environmental progress with a view to achieving sustainable
development. 30 7 However, these policies are largely voluntary and aspirational.
Moreover, there is an emerging international human right to development in
accordance with a people's indigenous priorities. 30 8 The Umted Nations Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples3°9 recognizes the potential
conflict between international development projects and the right of indigenous
31 0
people "to development in accordance with their own needs and interests.,
However, human rights claims have been asserted against corporations primarily m
situations involving major atrocities associated with resettlement projects, not in a
primarily economic context.311 The emerging right to development consistent with
a people's development priorities does not provide a basis to force a corporation to
forgo the most favorable profit opportunities.
Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol, which requires all "parties" to take regional
development priorities into account, is similarly unhelpful m binding multmational
corporations to formulate projects that reflect the wishes of developing country
partners that do not have a strong bargaining position based on profit potential.
Corporations are of course not parties to the Protocol.
It is a disquieting reality that much of the momentum and policies for the
304. Id.
305. Udombana, supra note 11, at 305, citing UNDP HuMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, 9
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4f7adc2l4b9a685c2569faOO5dOce7/ci25692700623b74cl256991003b5i47/$FILE/00085743.PDF
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E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, at 105 (Aug. 26, 1994).
310. Preamble, Paragraph 5, 8.
311. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied 532

U.S. 941 (2001).

DENv J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 32:4

impending industrialization in the developing world come from a cooperation
among a few highly developed countries and their multinational corporations.312
The developing countries' perception of this "partnersup, initially rooted in the
colomal era, has given rise to a "dependency" theory of international investment;
which posits that the dominant players in the developed world create investment
regimes that keep developing countries in a subservient role.3" 3 Modem
permutations include the view that developed countries' global warmmg policies
are a thinly disguised attempt to hamper the developing world's industrializationto "safeguard ongoing polluting behavior in developed countries '[by
preventing]
3 14
new polluting behavior from emerging in the industrializing world. ,
A related fear is that a climate-change regime dominated by the developed
countries will disseminate the worst aspects of capitalism and globalization,
unduly promoting privatization and undermining homegrown prescriptions for
alternative development paths. 3i 5 There is some cause for skepticism about the
"clean coal" climate-change strategy formulated in developed countries for
consumption abroad, at least in the sense that it will limit the options for Africa.
One U.S. company, identified as the "largest single source of greenhouse gases in
the western world, '0i 6 has begun investing heavily in "clean coal" plants for large
customers such as China.1 7 This overall trend, which will indeed limit the options
available to Africans in the countryside, is bolstered by government-funded
technology development programs3 i s and reflects heavy campaign contributions by
the coal mdustry.s 9
VII. CONCLUSION
The main issue posed by the foregoing factors is how to promote equitable,
environmentally sound economic development where it is needed most. The
African countries are the crux of this problem. It is in Africa that all of the
challenges come together, presenting the best opportunity for restructuring the
Protocol and the CDM in a creative way.
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These largely undeveloped countries possess a not-to-be-missed opportunity
to leapfrog over the archaic fossil fuel technologies that have caused global
environmental problems. However, their opportunity might indeed be missed
because the small, undeveloped markets and widespread poverty of these African
countries deter foreign investment in the best technologies and encourage resource
exploitation, a higher-than-necessary level of pollution, and investment in lowlevel technologies, especially those related to coal. These investments go hand in
hand with the prospect that African countries might be locked m to expensive coal
and other fossil-fuel energy systems that will deter creative investments well into
the future.
The developed countries' suggestions for maintaining the credibility of
Kyoto's joint implementation philosophy have included requiring developing
countries to "sign on to some form of commitment" to a graduated scheme of
emission-reduction obligations to secure the support of the developed countries. 320
Such suggestions seem to miss the point of the developing countries' equity
arguments almost entirely. Another, perhaps more feasible solution is for the
energy industry, rather than the African countries, to simply adapt. As the mdustry
has noted, "change brings opportunities, and the Kyoto Protocol, which includes
mechanisms to promote compliance on a cost-effective basis, may even provide
benefits. , ,32 i Despite their vocal public objections, the major fossil fuel companies
have already begun to invest in offsets. 22
There are a number of feasible pathways from African energy development
under the CDM. Large-scale and costly clean coal and other fossil-fuel
technologies are useful for large-scale commercial development. Small-scale and
decentralized energy technologies are uniquely suited to populations that will
otherwise be overlooked. In accordance with international law, Africans should
choose their own development path and set of associated problems. Perhaps
the
3 23
key point is that there be "challenges and opportunities" for Africans to seize.
However, the African energy dilemmas also point out a need for greater
awareness in the developed world. The Africans have presented several creative
suggestions. Some of these suggestions, such as the emission-avoidance approach
and a possible restructuring of the CER market, offer improvements both in the
flow of funds and technology to Africa and in the affordability of sustainable
development worldwide. Currently, technology development is being guided
along a "clean coal" pathway This pathway should be reexamined in the context
of the fossil fuel lock-in effect identified by Agarwal and the potential common
interest in the development of small-scale energy technologies with applications in
both developing and developed countries. The Kyoto Protocol presents an
opportunity to drop our belief that technology transfers benefit only the developing
320. Hanafi, supra note 213, at 473.
321. Gray E. Taylor, Global Climate Change Agreements-Do the Storm Clouds Have Silver
Lining?, 45 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. § 2.01 (1999).
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323. Moussa Cisse, Yuoba Sokona & Jean-Philippe Thomas, Introduction to NOTE ON
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 13.
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world.324 The key premise of the Protocol and its CDM is the feasibility of a "winwin" outcome.325

324. Id. at 65.
325. Hanafi, supra note 213, at 443.

